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| Nord Stream |
From The Valdai Discussion Club:
‘Eurasia’s Geoeconomic Reshuffling’: The Multipolar Effect of the Nord Stream Explosion by Valdir da Silva BezerraSince the mid-20th century, Russia and Europe have established a complementary and mutually beneficial relationship in the energy sector. Now, very few people remember, but when Putin came to power in 2000, one of the new president’s ideas was to strengthen Europe’s political independence by combining the continent’s technological and industrial capabilities with Russia’s abundance of natural resources. For Putin, a united Europe was paramount to establishing continental peace, based on a fair relationship between the West and Russia. Nevertheless, in order to achieve this unity, both sides had to abandon the past stereotypes of the Cold War era; otherwise, there could be no ‘Greater Europe’, much less a united one. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, politicians in Washington were also aware of these talks about combining Russian energy assets with Europe’s industrial might.
That’s why, starting in the early 2000s, United States policymakers began to raise concerns about Europe’s “dependence on Russian energy” during official talks with their Atlantic partners, instilling fears that the continent was about to become hostage to Moscow’s ‘geopolitical ambitions’. Taking things a step further, after the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, Washington began threatening European companies with sanctions for their involvement in geoeconomic and geostrategic projects, such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which was slated to connect Germany and Russia via the Baltic Sea.
Finally, following the start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, the world witnessed the most consequential act of infrastructure sabotage in European history, with the Nord Stream explosions of September 2022. In fact, the Nord Stream blast seemed to follow one of the most critical tenets of 20th-century British politics, formulated by the geographer Halford Mackinder, who advised against an alliance between Germany and Russia, as this would enable the Eurasian landmass to grow stronger than Great Britain’s sea power. Within that context, the cutting of Russia’s ‘umbilical cord’ to Europe represented the materialisation of Mackinder’s very advice, but at the cost of European taxpayers.
Before the blasts, Nord Stream 1 alone supplied about 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year, covering roughly 15% of all European gas consumption. The sudden loss of this infrastructure contributed to the surge in energy prices across the continent: by late 2022, wholesale natural gas prices in Europe had spiked to more than €300 per megawatt-hour—over 10 times higher than the average between 2016 and 2020. Industries dependent on cheap gas, especially in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, saw production slowdowns and temporary shutdowns, with German chemical output falling by roughly 10% in 2022. Households also faced soaring heating and electricity bills, prompting EU governments to spend over €600 billion in subsidies and emergency measures to cushion the impact. Beyond the economic shock, the explosions increased Europe’s vulnerability by forcing rapid diversification toward costlier liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and exposing the strategic risks of critical infrastructure sabotage.
An economic reshuffling also took place in Eurasia, while the amount of Russian gas flowing to Europe dropped to a minimum. Until 2021, Russia’s share in Europe’s total imports of natural gas was 43%. In 2023, this figure was down to only 14%. In Europe, the response to the Nord Stream explosion, as mentioned earlier, was marked by a diversification of gas suppliers and a change in gas logistics. If, in 2013, 82% of European gas imports came via pipelines (234 bcm) and only 18% (51 bcm) in liquefied form (LNG), by 2023, the situation had drastically reversed. LNG now represents approximately 60% of all gas imports (169 bcm) in Europe, while pipeline imports have fallen to 40% (111 bcm). That marks a 331% increase in LNG purchases by Europe over the course of a single decade! In this new scenario, the United States emerged as the leading supplier of LNG to Europe. Now, the North Americans account for approximately 45% of Europe’s LNG imports, followed by Qatar, which contributes 12% (on the other hand, Norway established itself as the largest pipeline gas supplier, accounting for about 33% of Europe’s total imports). As a result, Europe has increased its dependence on the United States, both politically and economically.
